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THE SUPREME COURT AND PUBLIC PRAYER: THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT

by Charles E. Rice
Fordham University Press, New York, 1964, Pp. 202. $5.00.
Reviewed by
PATRICK

From his very first sentence, Professor
Rice leaves no doubt in the reader's mind as
to his position on the recent "school
prayer" decisions of the United States Supreme Court: they were "wrongly decided."
He then devotes the next ten chapters to an
examination of the historical background
and the possible effects of the decisions, the
concepts of judicial restraint and alternative
legislative solutions. In the process he affirms
that the Supreme Court has substituted
agnosticism in place of theism as the religious position of the federal government.
He concludes that the situation is grave
enough to warrant immediate and strong
support for a constitutional amendment to
offset these decisions. In addition to historical passages quoted throughout the text,
Professor Rice adds appendices containing
references to God in colonial public documents, state constitutions and presidential
inaugural addresses.
To be sure, Professor Rice has chosen a
most timely topic for his volume. Unmistakably, judicial decisions in recent years
have shown a marked tendency to depart
from the established religious pluralism
which had dominated the World War II era.
The position of the federal government, for
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example, as evidenced by recent Supreme
Court rulings, is in a state of "agonizing
reappraisal." However, it would be a mistake to evaluate the Court's rulings in the
religious area without relating them to the
evolution which is taking place in all aspects
of individual liberty and governmental restraint. The "school prayer" decisions are
not as meaningful as the philosophy or fundamental attitude of the Court and the
future decisions which this outlook may
generate. Again, a step removed from the
Court's treatment of prayer and religion is
the future of the broader moral element in
state and local legislation. Is there a danger
that the Court in the foreseeable future may
preclude the various legislatures from considering public morals as a basis for legislation - except where the state can scientifically demonstrate a definite connection between the proscribed activity and subsequent, overt anti-social behavior?
The social upheaval which followed in
the wake of the Cold War and the semiannual storms which have broken over the
Court's rulings have made the task of the
constitutional law critic immeasurably more
difficult. If one takes the bench to task for
an isolated decision on a particular subject,
he may be criticized as seeking to implement a subjective preference grounded in a
religious, sectional or political bias. This
opprobrium has befallen many critics of

